On March 20, 2025, President Donald Trump signed a sweeping executive order aimed at accelerating domestic production of critical minerals to reduce reliance on foreign mineral supplies. In 2024, the U.S. remained heavily reliant on imports for critical minerals, with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) reporting that the nation was 100% import-dependent for 12 of the 50 minerals deemed "critical" and over 50% reliant for 28 others, highlighting vulnerabilities in its supply chains.1 The executive order outlines immediate steps to enhance American production of critical minerals, streamline permitting processes, and mobilize federal financing resources to support critical mineral projects.
The executive order, titled "Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production," follows Trump's January declaration of a national energy emergency and sets forth a comprehensive approach to revitalize domestic mining and processing capabilities. It assigns significant authority to the newly established National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC) and sets aggressive timelines for implementation across multiple federal agencies.
Key Takeaways
1. The order expands the definition of strategic minerals beyond the USGS list of Critical Minerals.
The executive order broadens the scope of minerals considered strategic to national security. Section 2(a) states '"Mineral" means a critical mineral, as defined by 30 U.S.C. 1606(a)(3), as well as uranium, copper, potash, gold, and any other element, compound or material as determined by the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC).' This expanded definition is significant as the critical mineral designation is often used to determine eligibility for federal funding and other support programs. By including these other materials in the executive order, it opens pathways for projects that consist of “mining, processing, refining, and smelting" of these materials for additional federal funding opportunities that would have previously been limited to the minerals listed on the U.S. Geological Survey's (USGS) list of critical minerals. In addition, it underscores the Trump Administration’s focus on supporting the supply chains for these materials, even though they were not previously designated as critical minerals.
Copper, for example, is not designated as a critical mineral on the USGS's list despite the crucial role it plays in electrical grids, weapon platforms, and the growing artificial intelligence sector. According to industry estimates, data centers alone will require between 330,000 and 420,000 tons of copper by 2030.2 This demand comes as the United States already imports more than 800,000 metric tons of refined copper annually and exports over 300,000 metric tons of copper scrap each year that could instead be recycled domestically.3,4 With severely diminished domestic recycling capacity, the U.S. now exports approximately 50% of its copper scrap, only to later import that same copper after it has been processed overseas, largely by China.5
The inclusion of uranium addresses America's nearly complete import reliance for nuclear power, which constituted approximately 19% of U.S. energy production in 2023.6 U.S. nuclear plants currently import more than 95+% of the uranium they consume, with significant volumes coming from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.7 By expanding eligible minerals, the order also strategically enables the sourcing of valuable by-products often found alongside primary minerals. For instance, antimony—critical for ammunition, flame retardants, and batteries—is frequently produced as a by-product of gold mining. Similarly, tellurium (used in solar panels) is primarily recovered during copper refining, while gallium (essential for semiconductors) is typically extracted during aluminum production, allowing for more economically viable extraction of minerals that might otherwise be uneconomical as standalone operations.
2. The order fast-tracks permitting and prioritizes mineral production on federal lands.
Acknowledging the United States' notoriously lengthy mine development timeline—among the longest in the world (an average of 29 years, longer than all but Zambia)—the executive order implements aggressive measures to accelerate permitting.8
Section 3(a) of the order mandates that within just 10 days, all relevant executive agencies must "provide to the Chair of the NEDC a list of all mineral production projects for which a plan of operations, a permit application, or other application for approval has been submitted." The NEDC Chair must then "identify priority projects that can be immediately approved."
In a significant shift in land-use priorities, Section 5(a) directs the Secretary of the Interior to "prioritize mineral production and mining-related purposes as the primary land uses" on federal lands known to hold mineral deposits. This opens up tens of millions of acres of federal lands for mineral development.9
The order further requires federal agencies to identify "as many sites as possible on Federal land" suitable for mineral production within 30 days, specifically targeting locations that "could be fully permitted and operational as soon as possible." Importantly, Section 2(b) of the order defines "mineral production" broadly as "the mining, processing, refining, and smelting of minerals, and the production of processed critical minerals and other derivative products." This sweeping definition encompasses virtually the entire mineral value chain, allowing federal lands to be used not just for extraction but also for value-added processing operations that have traditionally been performed overseas.
3. The order takes an unprecedented step in authorizing the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to finance domestic projects.
In a major policy shift, the executive order delegates Defense Production Act (DPA) authority to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), traditionally a development-oriented agency focused on projects in low- and middle-income countries.
Section 6(d) explicitly waives certain DPA requirements and delegates to the DFC CEO "the authority of the President conferred by sections 301, 302, and 303 of the DPA" for domestic mineral production projects. This represents a significant expansion of the DFC's role beyond its traditional international focus.
This delegation grants the DFC unprecedented powers for a development finance institution, including the ability to:
- Make direct loans and loan guarantees that "create, maintain, protect, expand, or restore domestic mineral production" (Section 301);
- Enter into purchase commitments and offtake agreements to create market certainty for mineral production (Section 302);
- Make direct purchases and investments to expand production capacity for critical minerals (Section 303).
Section 6(d) explicitly waives certain DPA requirements and delegates to the DFC CEO "the authority of the President conferred by sections 301, 302, and 303 of the DPA" for domestic mineral production projects. This represents a significant expansion of the DFC's role beyond its traditional international focus.
In 2020, the DFC was authorized $60 billion in available financing capacity,10 but its authorization is set to expire in September 2025, which could increase its funding levels.11 The DFC itself was created during the first Trump Administration in 2018 through the bipartisan Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, which consolidated U.S. development finance efforts under a new entity. Notably, the Trump administration initially opposed its predecessor organization, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and had proposed eliminating it in the 2018 budget. However, concerns about Chinese investment in developing nations through the Belt and Road Initiative led to a change in approach, with the administration ultimately supporting the BUILD Act, which passed with broad bipartisan support in Congress and was signed into law by President Trump on October 5, 2018.12
This upcoming reauthorization offers an opportunity to potentially increase funding levels and make program improvements to better support domestic mineral projects—a dramatic shift from the DFC's original international development mission.
This approach builds on a limited precedent set during the COVID-19 pandemic when the DFC received hundreds of millions in loan authority for medical supplies but vastly expands the scope to encompass the entire domestic minerals sector.
4. The order aims to streamline the financing processes for many loan programs provided by the federal government, but does not address long-acknowledged issues with key programs.
While the executive order does not allocate new funds into current programs, it aims to give federal agencies the ability to streamline and expedite their financing processes.
Section 6(b) delegates Defense Production Act authority to the Secretary of Defense, waiving requirements under 50 U.S.C. 4533(a)(1) through (a)(6) to streamline financing processes. This waiver removes procedural requirements like market surveys and formal determinations of essentiality, allowing the Secretary to more rapidly deploy DPA financing tools for mineral production projects without the usual administrative delays.
In addition, the executive order empowers the DFC with implementation authorities under 50 U.S.C. 4554, 4555, 4556, and 4560, which provide the legal framework for carrying out these financing activities under the Defense Production Act.
Additionally, Section 6(f) directs the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) to utilize its "Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative to secure United States offtake of global raw mineral feedstock for domestic minerals processing." This marks an interesting reversal of EXIM's traditional role—whereas EXIM typically finances foreign purchases of U.S. goods, this directive would have it finance U.S. purchases of foreign goods specifically for domestic production purposes.
EXIM operates under a two percent default cap that restricts its ability to support higher-risk mining projects.13 Industry stakeholders have frequently cited this cap as a significant constraint on EXIM's ability to support critical minerals projects, and its removal (or increase) is often included in recommendations aimed at enhancing EXIM's financing capabilities.14 The executive order does not address this limitation, which would require congressional action to modify. Notably, EXIM Bank's current authorization expires on December 31, 2026, which means that the re-authorization of EXIM next year could address this issue.15
5. The order creates a new "dedicated mineral production fund" through the Department of Defense Office of Strategic Capital.
The executive order establishes a novel financing mechanism specifically for minerals in Section 6(e), directing "the CEO of the DFC and the Secretary of Defense to develop and propose a plan... for the DFC to use Department of Defense investment authorities (including the DPA) and the Department of Defense Office of Strategic Capital to establish a dedicated mineral and mineral production fund for domestic investments."
This provision is particularly significant as it leverages the Department of Defense Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), a relatively new entity that recently conducted its first Funding Opportunity Announcement earlier this year.16 The OSC was created to help build enduring investment relationships with the private sector in areas critical to national security, and this directive would significantly expand its scope and funding capabilities specifically for minerals.
The creation of this dedicated fund represents a new approach to minerals financing, combining DFC's newly granted domestic authorities with the Department of Defense's (DOD's) strategic investment capabilities. Unlike other provisions in the order that simply redirect existing funding mechanisms, this establishes an entirely new financial vehicle specifically designed to address the capital intensity of mineral projects.
While the order does not specify the size of this dedicated fund, it creates a structure that could potentially be expanded through future appropriations or partnership with private capital. The plan must be approved by the Secretary of Defense, the CEO of the DFC, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, indicating its strategic importance to the administration.
6. The order aims to coordinate federal purchasing power to create market demand for critical minerals that are produced domestically.
Beyond financing, the executive order seeks to leverage federal purchasing power to create market demand and certainty for mineral producers.
Section 6(g) directs the "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy to convene buyers of minerals and work towards an announced request for bids to supply the minerals." This approach could potentially create government-backed offtake agreements, providing the demand stability needed to attract private investment.
The order also instructs the Small Business Administration in Section 6(h) to "prepare and submit... recommendations for legislation to enhance private-public capital activities to support financing to domestic small businesses engaged in mineral production" within 45 days, signaling potential future legislative proposals to further support the sector.
By coordinating federal purchasing and creating clear demand signals, the administration aims to create the market certainty needed for private capital to flow into domestic mineral projects despite the lack of new appropriations in the executive order itself.
The executive order represents Trump's first major policy action on critical minerals since taking office in January 2025 and sets the stage for what appears to be a priority issue for his administration. Its implementation will depend heavily on agency coordination and potentially additional congressional action to fully achieve its stated objectives.
How Ankura Can Help
Ankura's Global Strategic Advisory team specializes in helping businesses across the United States and abroad navigate and secure federal and state incentives to support growth, innovation, and development. As policy priorities shift with the Trump Administration, our team monitors developments and provides tailored support to maximize the value of available programs. Whether you are seeking tax credits, grants, or financing for your projects, we ensure you stay ahead of evolving opportunities. Our services include:
- Incentive Eligibility Assessment: Identifying the programs and opportunities best suited to your organization's needs and goals, with particular attention to emerging opportunities in energy development, tribal partnerships, and public land initiatives.
- Strategic Application Support: Guiding you through the application process, ensuring compliance with program requirements, and developing compelling submissions that align with new federal priorities and streamlined permitting processes.
- Financial Modeling and Impact Analysis: Creating detailed financial models to highlight the value of incentives and their impact on your projects, including analysis of market-driven approaches to emissions reduction and energy development opportunities.
- Stakeholder Advocacy: Engaging with local, state, and federal officials to build support for your projects and secure necessary approvals, with specialized expertise in tribal consultation and multi-jurisdictional projects.
With over $300 million in state incentives and $375 million in federal incentives secured for our clients in the past year, Ankura is your trusted partner in leveraging incentive programs to achieve your strategic objectives. Contact us here.
References
[1] USGS. Value of U.S. Mineral Production Edged Up in 2024. January 31, 2025.
[2] Fastmarkets. DeepSeek, data centers and copper demand | Hotter Commodities. February 6, 2025.
[3] USGS. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023. February 24, 2022.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Fastmarkets from data released by the U.S. Commerce Department.
[6] U.S. Department of Energy. Nuclear. 2025.
[7] EIA. U.S. nuclear generators import nearly all the uranium concentrate they use. January 30, 2025.
[8] Mining. US has second-longest mine development timeline in the world, S&P Global says. July 18, 2024.
[9] Bureau of Land Management. Critical Mineral Supply Chain. December 11, 2023.
[10] JD Supra. Understanding the New $60 Billion U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). August 18, 2020.
[11] CSIS. The Clock Is Ticking on DFC Reauthorization. February 14, 2025.
[13] Congressional Research Service. Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank). January 19, 2024.
[14] CSIS. The U.S. EXIM Bank in an Age of Great Power Competition. June 18, 2024.
[15] Securitas. EXIM Reauthorized Through 2026. January 14, 2020.
[16] Department of Defense. Office of Strategic Capital Announces First Notice of Funding Availability to Secure the U.S. Industrial Base. September 30, 2024.
Sign up to receive all the latest insights from Ankura. Subscribe now
© Copyright 2025. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily the views of Ankura Consulting Group, LLC., its management, its subsidiaries, its affiliates, or its other professionals. Ankura is not a law firm and cannot provide legal advice.
